Necessity as a Defence in Criminal Cases by Hitchler, W. H.
Volume 33 
Issue 3 Dickinson Law Review - Volume 33, 
Issue 3 
3-1-1929 
Necessity as a Defence in Criminal Cases 
W. H. Hitchler 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra 
Recommended Citation 
W. H. Hitchler, Necessity as a Defence in Criminal Cases, 33 DICK. L. REV. 138 (1929). 
Available at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra/vol33/iss3/4 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Dickinson Law IDEAS. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Dickinson Law Review by an authorized editor of Dickinson Law IDEAS. For more 
information, please contact lja10@psu.edu. 
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10. Complaints, petitions, answers, and all communica-
tions shall be made to the Board and sent to the Secretary.
NECESSITY AS A DEFENCE IN CRIMINAL
CASES-The wreck of the Vestris has been followed, as
such disasters usually are, by conflicting stories as to the
behavior of the members of the crew and the passengers
under the extreme pressure of the circumstances to which
they were subjected. These stories have revived interest
and renewed speculation as to the existence and scope of
"necessity" as a defence in criminal cases.
It has been stated as a general rule that "an act which
would otherwise constitute a crime is justifiable .or excus-
able if done under necessity."' Necessitas non habet legem.
The term "necessity" is used, however, to describe two
distinct defences: (1) Physical impossibility or necessity;
and (2) the extreme pressure of circumstances.2 The treat-
ment of these two defences as if they were the same is
one of the oldest "fallacies of the law".'
The theory of the first defence, which has been said
to be "true necessity", is that an act cannot be a crime if
it is purely involuntary, i. e., if the doing of the act in
question in no degree depended upon the wish or desire
of the person charged with doing it.' It may be defined
as existing whenever the act complained of does not de-
pend in any (even the slightest) degree upon the wish
or desire of the person whose conduct is in question. 5 In
such cases "as the party is mentally passive, it cannot be
said that he acts.".. "The prima facie agent is not really
the agent at all, but the instrument or means.
' 7
'16 C. J. 91.
2Clark and Marshall on Crimes, 3rd ed. sec. 68; May's Criminal
Law, 3rd ed. sec. 66.
3The Eliza Lines, (1905) 199 U. S. 119, 130, per Holmes, J.
4"There may be cases of true necessity where the volition of
the defendant has no share in the result". May's Criminal Law,
3rd ed. sec. 68. "The law does not require the impossible. If a
man, seeing his duty, has, to the best of his ability endeavored to
perform it, the law will not visit punishment upon his failure from
inability." Rood, Criminal Law, p. 59.
5Stroud, Mens Rea, p. 188. "If under circumstances which
allow no possibility of choice, one is compelled to do a prohibited
act, he is not punishable for no crime is committed." 13 Harvard
Law Review, p. 411.
6Austin, Jurisprudence, p. 1060 n.
7Clark, Analysis of Criminal Liability, p. 33.
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The propriety of this defence has been asserted in a
variety of cases.' Hale gave an illustration which has be-
come classic: "If there be an actual forcing of a man, as
if A by force takes the arm of B and the weapon in his
hand, and therewith stabs C, whereof he dies; this is murder
in A but B is not guilty." The defence is not, however,
confined to cases of compulsion by human agencies. The
inevitable necessity may arise from natural causes-from
the surrounding circumstances. 10 As to this defence, "there
can be no doubt."'" It differs from the second defence in
the fact that in this defence the volition of the defendant
has no share in the result. The circumstances must be such
that no room is left, so far as the defendant is concerned,
for wish or desire of any kind, as determining the conduct
complained of. If there be any room for choice of action,
the defence ceased to be one of "true necessity" and be-
comes one of the "extreme pressure of circumstances. 1
The pressure of circumstances upon a person may be
so great as to justify him for doing an act which, but for
such pressure, would be a crime. 1 The idea underlying this
defence is that the fact that one who inflicted harm upon
another's person or property or the public, did so for the
purpose of avoiding some greater evil to himself, may con-
stitute a defence. Occasions for invoking this defence arise
where a person is reduced to a choice of evils. He is so
situated that in order to escape what he dislikes most, he
must do something which he dislikes less, altho he may dis.
8Stroud, Mens Rea. p. 188.
9Hale Historia Placitorum Coronal, p. 433.
'The following cases illustrate this defence. Reg. v. Bamber
5 Q. B. 279, (1843) 114 Eng. Reprint 1254; C. v. Brooks 99 Mass.,
434 (1868); C. v. N. Y. C. R. R. 202 Mass. 394. (1909) 88 N. E. 764,
16 Am. Cas. 587; C. & 0. R. R. v. C. 119 Ky. 519, (1905) 84 S. W. 566
"'McClain, Criminal Law, sec. 136.
' 2"The difference between the two is the difference between an
act and no act. The distinction is well settled in the parallel in-
stance of duress by threats, as distinguished from overmastering
physical force applied to a man's body and imparting to it the motion
sought to be attributed to him. In the former case there is a choice
and therefore an act, no less when the motive is commonly recognized
as very strong or even generally overpowering, than where it is one
which would affect the particular person only and not the public at
large". The Eliza Lines 199 U. S. 119, 130, (1905) per Holmes, J.
31n Reg. v. Dudley L. R., 14 Q. B. Div. 273, (1884) Coleridge,
C. J., said that this "was not what the law has ever called 'necessity'.
It is sometimes called 'extreme benefit' or 'extreme need'."
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
like extremely what he determines to do. There is a
choice, although it may be a choice between extreme evils."
The so-called "necessity" here contemplated resides not in
the act itself, but in the external conditions which surround
the actor when the act is performed. The question pre-
sented when this defence is raised is whether the purpose
of avoiding an injury threatened to one's self or another will
serve as an excuse for doing an act which would otherwise
be criminal.' 5
The defence has been recognized in civil cases from
earliest times.'6 It would seem that it should be more
readily admissable in criminal cases than in civil cases be-
cause: (1) The object of the former is not to compensate
for loss, but to punish guilt, which seems to be almost en-
tirely absent; (2) punishment and the threat thereof must
fail to accomplish its great object, deterrence, where the
evil which it threatens is less than that which would have
been suffered if the alleged criminal act had not been
committed.?
The defence is "one of the curiosities of the law.""' The
law upon it is extremely scanty and vague. It is rccognized
in some systems other than the common law, even to the
extent of recognizing the right of an innocent person to
protect himself in extreme emergencies by the sacrifice of
those who are also innocent. 19 The French Penal Code
provides that there is neither crime nor offense when the
defendant has been constrained by a force which he could
not resist (contraint par une force a la quelle il n'a pu
resister.)10 In a recent case in Germany it appeared that a
l4Stephen, History of Criminal Law, vol. 2, p. 102.
15Robinson's Elementary Law, 2nd ed. p. 533.
"6 Pollock on Torts, 6th ed. p. 168; 13 Harvard Law Review, p.
599; 23 Harvard Law Review 599; 17 Dickinson Law Review, p. 168;
Owen v. Cook 9 N. D. 134, (1899) 81 N. W. 285; Gregson v. Gilbert
3 Douglas 232.
17Henny, Criminal Law, llth ed. p. 74. This is especially true
where death is the immediate consequence of refraining from doing
the criminal act.
lsStephen, History of Criminal Law, vol. 2, p. 108.
19Robinson, Elementary Law, 2nd ed. p. 534.
20The manner in which the French law deals with cases of
"physical constraint", "moral constraint" and "necessity" is set forth
by Garcon, Code Penal, vol. 1, pp. 176-182. See also Moriand's able
monograph, Le Delit Necessaire. See also the Italian Penal Code,
sec. 49, and the German Penal Code, sec. 54.
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teacher of athletics and her escort, a merchant, were riding
in a row boat on a lake, when a sudden storm arose which
caused the boat to leak. The teacher, who was the strong-
er of the two, pushed her male friend into the water in
order to save herself. He was drowned. The girl was
rescued and tried for manslaughter. The German Supreme
Court applied the provision of the German Code to the
effect that anybody who, in order to save his own life or
that of a near relative, kills another is not guilty, and ac-
quitted the girl.
The English authorities are not numerous. Stephen
declared that the subject was one "on which the law of
England was so vague that, if cases raising the question
should ever occur the judges would be practically able to
lay down any rule which they considered expedient."'"
Lord Bacon, in his commentary upon the -maxim,"necessitas inducit privilegqium quoad jura privata", said, "ne-
cessity carrieth a privilege in itself. Necessity is of three
sorts-necessity of conservation of life, necessity of obedi-
ence, and necessity of the act of God or a stranger. First
of conservation of life: if a man steals viands to satisfy his
present hunger, this is no felony. So if divers be in danger
of drowning by the casting away of some boat or barge,
and one of them get to some plank or on the boat's side
to keep himself above water, and another to save his life,
thrust him from it, whereby he is drowned, this is neither
se defendendo nor by misadventure but is justifiable."
22
Bacon's dictum that stealing to satisfy hunger is not
larceny is hardly supported by Staunforde, whom he cited
for it; it is expressly contradicted by Lord Hale ;23 and
Blackstone declared that it was an "unwarranted doctrine
borrowed from the notions of some civilians, and that the
law of England admitted of no such excuse. "And this is
founded upon the highest reason: for men's properties
would be under a strange insecurity, if liable to be invaded
according to the wants of others, of which wants no man
can possibly be an adequate judge, but the party himself
21History of Criminal Law, p. 108. This was written in 1883,
a year before the decision in Reg. v. Dudley L. R. Q. B. Div. 273. In
a later work, written after this decision, Stephen declared that the
defence "is hardly ever raised, and when raised, is always, as it
ought to be, to be dealt with exceptionally. There is not, and I
think there cannot be, any principle involved in cases of this kind."
A General View of the Criminal Law, p. 76.
22Maxims, Reg. V.
23Historia Placitorum Coronal, p. 54.
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wvho pleads them. Where charity is reduced to a system,
and interwoven in our very constitution, our laws ought
by no means to be taxed with being unmerciful for denying
this privilege to the necessitous."'2
Bacon's dictum as to the boat or plank, "tabulum in
nanfragio", is said to be derived from the canonists.2 5 He
cited no authority for it.21 Hawkins stated it cautiously
and in a somewhat modified form: "If two be shipwrecked
together, and one of them get upon a plank to save him-
self, and the other also, having no means to save his life,
,get upon the same plank, and finding it unable to save them
both, thrust the other from it, whereby he is drowned,
it seems that he who thus preserves his own life at the ex-
pense of that of another, may justify the fact by the in-
evitable.necessity of the case."'27 Blackstone approved the
dictum in this modified form, saying, "He who thus pre-
serves his own life at the expense of another man's is
excusable through unavoidable necessity, and the principle
of self defence- since their both remaining on the plank is
a mutual, though innocent, attempt upon and endangering
of each other's life." 28  On the other hand, the court in
Req. v. Dudley appear to have been willing, if necessary,
to overrule the dictum about the plank, though Stephen con-
sidered that their actual decision did not overrule it.29
Stroud declared that it was an "exploded theory,' 30 but it
24Commentaries. The question has caused much speculation.
Grotius and Puffendorf and many other foreign jurists have agreed
with Bacon's dictum. Cicero asserted the contrary, declaring that
"suum cuique incommodum ferendum est, potius quam de alterius
conmmodis detrahendum". The Jewish law, as certified by Solomon,
declared: "If a thief steals to satisfy his soul when he is hungry,
lie shall restore sevenfold." This was the ordinary punishment for
theft. In a case at Amiens, France, in 1898, the Court of Appeal acted
upon Bacon's principle. The contrary view seems, however, to be
more generally adopted by French judges. Henny, Criminal Law, p. 76.
25Bacon revived an ancient problem which Cicero had cited from
the Rhodian moralist, Hecato.
26Reg. v. Dudley, L. R. Q. B. Div. 273, (1884).
27Pleas of the Crown, Book I, c. 10, sec. 16.
28Commentaries.
29Digest of Criminal Law, Art. 33.
30 Mens Rea. p. 259.
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has been expressly approved in an American case. 1
Blackstone recognized the existence of the defence.
"A sixth species of defect of will is that arising from com-
pulsion and inevitable necessity. These are a restraint upon
the will, whereby a man is urged to do that which his
judgment disapproves, and which it is to be presumed, his
will (if left to itself) would reject. As punishments are
therefore only inflicted for the abuse of that free will which
God has given to man, it is highly just and expedient that
a man should be excused for those acts which are done
through inevitable force and compulsion.
'32
Though some of the English law writers have been
willing to accept the defence, in the only English case in
which it was expressly raised, it failed.33 Three men and a
boy escaped in an open boat from the shipwreck of the
yacht Mignonette. On the twentieth day, when they were
a thousand miles from land and had been eight days without
food, the men killed the boy and fed on his flesh for four
days, after which they were rescued by a passing ship.
At the time of the killing there was no ship in sight and
no reasonable prospect of relief; starvation was imminent;
the boy, particularly, being in an extremely weak condition.
On their arrival in England two of the men were tried for
murder. Their counsel relied upon Lord Bacon's dictum
about the nlnnk, but the court held that they were guilty
31U. S. v. Holmes, I Wall Jr. 1. In considering the plank case
three different situations may be distinguished: (1) A gets to the
plank and shoves B, who attempts to get on, off. A, it is said, would
be justified. It is a case not of necessity but self defence. May's
Criminal Law, 3rd ed. p. 69; (2) A gets to the plank first and B
shoves him off. Bacon says B would be justified because of necessity.
Reg. v. Dudley intimates the contrary and Stroud so declares; (3) A
and B get to plank at the same time, and A shoves B off. Black-
stone and Hawkins think that A would be justified. May thinks
he would not be.
32Commentaries, vol. 4, p. 28.
33Reg. v. Dudley, L. R. Q. B. Div. 273 (1884). There is a dic-
tum by Lord Mansfield, in Rex v. Stratton 21 How. St. Tr. 1046, to
the effect that an act of treason, like the deposition of a colonial
governor, might, in circumstances of public danger, be justified by
its "necessity". The correctness of this dictum was apparently con-
ceded by Lord Coleridge in Reg. v. Dudley, but it has been stated
that the judgment in Rex v. Stratton "cannot be regarded as giving
any considerable measure of support to the general excuse of neces-
sity." Stroud, Mens Rea. p. 308.
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of murder. In delivering the judgment, Lord Coleridge
dealt exhaustively with all the supposed authorities for the
alleged excuse of necessity and pointed out that they had
failed to establish any such principle. He stated that
Bacon's dictum about stealing food had been scouted by
Hale, and that if necessity could not excuse theft, it cer-
tainly could not excuse murder. He appears to have been
willing, if necessary, to overrule the dictum about the plank.
It has been stated that "the law regarding the sup-
posed excuse of necessity is now fortunately settled by the
famous case of Reg. v. Dudley,s ' but this is not clear.
The court said that "there are many conceivable states of
things" in which Bacon's dictum might be true, but de-
clared emphatically that there was no general principle of
law which entitled a man to take the life of an innocent
person in order to save his own. "The ratio decidendi was
the broad and salutary principle that, except in defence
against acts of oppression, within the well defined limits
of homicide se et sua defendendo, no persons are allowed to
destroy human life, for the purpose of saving the lives of
themselves, or of some of them."35
Stephen thought that Reg. v. Dudley should be treated
as a case apart from all others, from which no principle
can be gathered for the supposed excuse of necessity, which
he vaguely suggests should be more or less capriciously ap-
plied to, or withheld from, such extraordinary cases, as and
when they arise. He expressly distinguished the plank
case. "The boy was deliberately put to death with a
knife * * *. This is quite different * * * from the two men
on a plank. Here the successful man does no bodily harm
to the other. He leaves him a chance to get another
plank." 86  This distinction has been declared to be "ob-
viously absurd", and "to have been written in a spirit of
grim humor."
31
The extreme pressure of circumstances has been rec-
ognized as a defence in the United States in a variety of
34Stroud, Mens Rea, p. 259.
3
5 1t is interesting to note that, prior to the wreck of the Mig-
nonette, Stephen had said that in the case of shipwrecked people
in a boat unable to carry them all, "it is impossible to suppose that
the survivors would be subjected to legal punishment." History of
Criminal Law, vol. 2, p. 108. In Reg. v. Dudley a sentence of death
was later commuted to ten years imprisonment at hard labor.
86Digest of Criminal Law, Art. 33.
aStroud, Mens Rea, p. 263.
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cases.3 8 Perhaps the leading, as well as the most interest-
ing, case is that of the wreck of the William Brown, which
furnished the basis of the litigation in U. S. v. Holmes
3 9
and the theme for the book "Human Jettison." In this
case, after a shipwreck, members of the crew threw over-
board fourteen passengers in order to lighten the load of a
life boat which was leaking. On the following morning the
life boat was picked up by a passing vessel. Upon the
trial of one of the crew for manslaughter, the .principal
defence was "necessity," by virtue of which it was contend-
ed that the killing was justified. The court recognized the
existence of a law of necessity by virtue of which if two
persons who owe no duty to each other that is not mutual,
should by iccident, not attributable to either, be placed in
a position where both cannot survive, neither is bound to
save the other's life by sacrificing his own, nor would
either commit a crime in a struggle for the only means of
safety", but held that this principle did not apply where
the slayer was "under a legal obligation to make his own
safety secondary to others, as in the case of crew and
passengers." The court said, "While we admit that sailor
and sailor may lawfully struggle with each other for the
plank which can save but one, we think that if the passenger
is on the plank, even the law of necessity justifies not the
sailor who takes it from him." "When a ship is lost by
tempest or other danger of the sea, and all aboard have
taken themselves for safety to the small boats, * * * the
sailor is bound to undergo whatever hazard is necessary
to preserve the boat and the passengers. Should the
emergency become so extreme as to call for the sacrifice
of life, there is no reason why the law does not still
remain the same." The court said further that, if there
were time, "there should be consultation and some mode of
selection fixed by which those in equal relations should
have an equal chance for life." The selection of the par-
ticular persons to be sacrificed in such a case, said the
88 U. S. v. Ashton, Fed. Cas. No. 14, 470 (refusal of crew to
obey captain's order to continue voyage with an unseaworthy ship);
The Brig William Gray, Fed. Cas. No. 17, 694 (violation of em-
bargo due to stress of weather); Res. v. McCarty, 2 Dail. 86 (join-
ing enemy to keep from famishing); C. v. Patterson, 16 W. N. C.
193 (selling liquor without a prescription in an emergency); S. v.
Jackson, 71 N. H. 552, 53 A. 102 (withdrawal of child from school
because of ill health.
391 Wall, Jr., 1, Fed. Cas. No. 15, 383.
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court, should be by lot. "When the selection is by lot the
victim yields of course to his fate; or, if he resists, force
may be employed to coerce submission."40
Stephen, speaking of this case, said, "Such a view ap-
pears to me to be over refined. Self sacrifice may or may
not be a moral duty, but it seems hard to make it a legal
duty, and it is impossible to state its limits or the principle
upon which they can be determined. Suppose one of the
party in the boat had a revolver and was able to use it,
and refused to draw lots or to allow himself or his wife
or daughter to be made to do so, or to be thrown overboard,
could anyone deny that he was acting in self defence or in
defence of his nearest relations, and would he violate any
legal duty in so doing ?""4
From the decision and dicta in the Holmes case, it
appears that: (1) the so-called law of necessity will in some
cases excuse a positive act resulting in death; (2) in cases
of imminent and deadly peril, it justifies a killing by one
owing no special duty to another; (3) it does not justify
a killing by one. owing a duty to subordinate his own safety
to that of the person killed, in which class falls the killing
of a passenger by a seaman; (4) as between passenger and
passenger, and seaman and seaman, no special duty exists.'
2
The existence, in case of shipwreck, of a moral duty of
a captain to his crew, of the crew to passengers, and of
men to women and children has been judicially recog-
nized.4 3 The existence of a legal duty of crew to passengers
has also been judicially asserted.4 The moral duty of men
to women was fulfilled by the crew in the Holmes case,
but there is no authority that, in such cases, there is a
legal duty. No legal foundation for the now familiar phrase
"women and children first" has been found.
4
0
1n Reg. v. Dudley, Lord Coleridge, speaking of U. S. v.
Holmes, said, "The American case in which it was decided, correct-
ly indeed, that sailors had no right to throw passengers overboard
to save themselves, but, on the rather strange ground that the pro-
per mode of determining who was to be sacrificed was to vote upon
the subject by ballot (?) can hardly be an authority satisfactory
to a court in this country." There would, indeed, be something
grotesque in the notion of a right to vote in such a case.
,"History of Criminal Law, vol. 2, p. 109.
"2Law Notes, June, 1912. It has been suggested that sailors
who take the life boats leaving the passengers behind to perish
are criminally liable within the principle of the Holmes case.
43 Reg. v. Dudley.
"4U. S. v. Holmes.
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The exact limits of the defence under discussion, even
if it is to be recognized, are difficult to determine."8 How
extreme must the emergency be? An eminent authority
has essayed the following definition: "An act which would
otherwise be a crime may in some cases be excused if the
accused can show: (1) that it was done in order to avoid
consequences which could not otherwise be avoided; and
(2) which, if they had followed, would have inflicted on
him or others whom he was bound to protect inevitable
and irreparable evil; (3) that no more was done than
reasonably necessary for that purpose; and (4) that the
evil inflicted by it was not disproportionate to the evil
avoided. The extent of the principle is uncertain."
4 6  It
has been declared that this statement is vague and un-
certain, and that nothing can be said in favor of this defini-
tion except that the last sentence renders it comparatively
harmless; but it has been quoted with approval and applied
in an American case.
4 7
Perhaps it is scarcely safe to lay down any more defi-
nite rule than one suggested by Stephen, viz., "It is possible
to imagine cases in which the expediency of breaking the
law is so overwhelmingly great that people may be justified
in breaking it; but these cases cannot be defined before-
hand, and must be adjudicated by a jury afterward, the
jury not being under the pressure which influenced the al-
leged offenders." "I see no good in trying to make the
law more definite than this, and there would, I think, be
danger in attempting to do so. There is no fear that
people will be too ready to obey the ordinary law. There
is great fear that they would be too ready to avail them-
selves of exceptions which they might suppose to apply
to their circumstances." 8
The recognition of the defence of the extreme pressure
of circumstances may be justified on either one of two
theories: (1) that self preference is proper in the cases
supposed; or (2) that, even if it is improper, the law can-
not prevent it by punishment, because a threat of punish-
ment at a future time is not sufficient to overcome the
fear of present evil. Under either theory the defence is
difficult to delimit.
4
5"Who is to be the judge of this sort of necessity?" Reg. v.
Dudley.
46Stephen, Digest of Criminal Law, Art. 32.
47C. & 0. R. R. v. Com. 119 Ky. 519, 84 S. W. 566.
4$Stephen, History of Criminal Law, vol. 2, p. 110.
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The first theory is based on the assumption that in cer-
tain cases a person may sacrifice another for himself and
a fortiori that a people may. Its application requires a com-
parison of values. When it is applied in a prosecution for
homicide, it might well be asked, "By what measure is
the comparative value of lives to be measured? Is it to
be strength, or intellect, or what? ' 4 9 A distinction might
well be taken between: (1) cases where the criminal act
inflicts injury on a private person; and (2) cases where
it does not. It might well be for the public interest in the
first class of cases in order to prevent the increase of
crime, to hold that a man should be held to a choice of
evils, injury to himself or criminal punishment, and should
not be allowed to shift his injury to another. On the other
hand, where the criminal act directly injures no individual,
the result of excusing the act is not to allow the shifting
of the burden to another person, but to benefit one at the
cost of allowing an act that ordinarily public policy for-
bids, and it would seem that extreme emergencies might
afford a justification.
5 0
The adoption of the second theory involves an abandon-
ment of the retributive and an adoption of the deterrent
theory of punishment. Punishment for deterrence should
be inflicted only where it is possible to deter. Where
deterrence is impossible such punishment should be re-
nounced. A man may have motives adverse to the law of
such great strength as to overcome any fear that can be
inspired by the terror of any legal punishment. He may
be urged to the commission of a crime by motives more
proximate and imperious than any sanction the law can
hold out. In such cases, as the threats of the law are
necessarily ineffective, they should not be made, and their
fulfillment is gratuitous cruelty-the infliction of needless
and uncompensated evil.
W. H. HITCHLER
WILLS - CONSTRUCTION- NEXT OF KIN. IN
RE: Stoler's Estate, 293 Pa. 433, decided by the Supreme
Court, Pennsylvania, June 30, 1928.
Testator in his will gave to his wife a life estate in all
of his property and then provided as follows:
49Reg. v. Dudley, supra.
5OThe stealing bread cases would come in the first class. The
embargo, and liquor cases, in the second. May, Criminal Law, 3rd
ed., sec. 68.
